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Abstract
Kitcher (1996) offers a critique of connectionism based on the
belief that connectionist information processing relies
inherently on metric similarity relations. Metric similarity
measures are independent of the order of comparison (they
are symmetrical) whereas human similarity judgments are
asymmetrical. We answer this challenge by describing how
connectionist systems naturally produce asymmetric
similarity effects. Similarity is viewed as an implicit by-
product of information processing (in particular
categorization) whereas the reporting of similarity judgments
is a separate and explicit meta-cognitive process. The view of
similarity as a process rather than the product of an explicit
comparison is discussed in relation to the spatial, feature, and
structural theories of similarity.
1. Introduction
Connectionist models of cognitive processing have been
criticized for their apparent reliance on a notion of
psychological similarity that empirical evidence has
demonstrated to be flawed (Kitcher, 1996). This argument is
based on the belief that connectionist information
processing relies on metric distance measures of similarity.
Whether the similarity occurs at the level of the input
representation, the hidden unit representation, or the output
representation, proximal tokens in a multi-dimensional
space (defined by the characteristics of the task) are
processed similarly. This, argues Kitcher, is necessarily
wrong since metric distance measures have been ruled out
as plausible models of psychological similarity.
In this paper, we argue that non-metric similarity
measures do arise naturally out of connectionist information
processing. These measures are based on functional
transformations and are not constrained to obey the metric
axioms of Minimality, Symmetry, and the Triangle
Inequality. Therefore, they are immune to the objection that
psychological similarity does not itself appear to obey the
metric axioms (Kitcher, 1996; Tversky, 1977). We will
suggest that there are two similarity processes in the
cognitive system. One is non-metric and arises naturally
from the functional transformation properties of non-linear
connectionist information processing. The other can be
metric and is constructed from the outcome of a prior and
inevitable non-metric phase of processing. The non-metric
component is implicit and not accessible to meta-cognitive
processes. The metric component is only engaged when the
evaluation of similarity has to be made explicit (e.g., it has
to be communicated) such as in a similarity judgment task.
That is, the initial comparison is implemented by a non-
metric transformation; the requirement to make a similarity
judgment introduces a further metric comparison process.
We will argue that under certain conditions, functional
transformation measures can generate behavior similar to
metric distance measures, and hence that metric distance
measures offer an approximate description of the processes
underlying similarity judgments.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. First, we
present Kitcher’s (1996) argument in more detail and
discuss asymmetry as a counter example to metric distance
measures of similarity. Then we present the
Transformational Function Similarity (TFS) measure and
discuss how it overcomes the asymmetry problems of metric
measures. Finally, we discuss how a metric comparison
measure can be constructed from the products of prior TFS
stage.
2. Connectionism and metric similarity
A recent attack on connectionist information processing
as a model of cognition has focused on the question of how
information is processed in a network (Kitcher, 1996).
Kitcher begins by unpacking Churchland and Sejnowski' s
(1992) characterization of activation patterns in a network in
terms of vectors. The implication of this characterization is
that the activation patterns define a multidimensional vector
space that naturally supports metric distance measures. The
similarities between objects are reflected by the distance
between the positions their representations occupy in
activation space. However, Tversky (1977) has identified a
number of ways in which psychological notions of
similarity do not appear to accord with predictions of a
metric model of similarity. Although his efforts to show that
Minimality and the Triangle Inequality do not hold for
human similarity judgments may be inconclusive,
Symmetry certainly does not hold in human similarity
judgments (Hahn & Chater, 1996). As a result, we will
focus our discussion on the notion of symmetry in
psychological similarity.
Symmetry in this context is taken to mean that similarity
judgments are commutative. In other words:
aSb = bSa where xSy is the similarity of x to y     (1)
Let a and b be two tokens that can be described as
occupying positions in a metric space. Then, the similarity
relation is the same whatever the order of comparison.
Studies requiring subjects to rate the similarity of a pair of
items suggests that this is not the case with psychological
notions of similarity (e.g., Tversky & Gati, 1978). For
example, when asked to compare pairs of concepts, subjects
readily rated North Korea as being more similar to Red
China than Red China was to North Korea. In short,
reported similarity seems to change according to the order
of the comparison.
3. Solutions to the asymmetry problem
Most theories of similarity have grappled with the
asymmetry problem. The spatial theory of similarity (e.g.,
Rips, Shoben, and Smith, 1973; Rumelhart and
Abrahamson, 1973) envisages concepts as points in a multi-
dimensional space. The similarity between two concepts
corresponds to their distance (e.g., Euclidean distance) apart
in this space. This theory can account for asymmetric
comparisons provided each concept is given a bias
(Nosofsky, 1991). The bias relates to how easy it is to
process a given concept. The direction of travel between the
concepts in similarity space (corresponding to the order of
the comparison) interacts with their respective biases. If the
two concepts have different biases, the similarity will be
different depending on the direction of travel. The feature
theory of similarity (Tversky, 1977) measures the similarity
between two concepts as some function of the number of
features they have in common and the number on which
they differ. This theory can account for the asymmetry by
proposing that concepts have features with different
salience. The concepts will be judged more similar if the
features that the concepts have in common have a higher
salience in the second term of the comparison (Ortony,
Vondruska, Foss, and Jones, 1985). The structural
alignment theory of similarity (Markman and Gentner,
1993; Medin, Goldstone, and Gentner, 1993) measures the
similarity between two concepts depending on how well the
structures of each concept can map onto one another. This
theory can account for the asymmetry as long as the
coherence of the structures of the concepts is taken into
account (Gentner and Bowdle, 1994). Coherence is defined
as the degree of systematicity a concept possesses. A
coherent concept will have many "causal or explanatory
connections" (Gentner and Bowdle, 1994, p. 352).
Similarity judgments are higher if the more coherent
concept is the second term in a comparison.
In all these theories, the basic definition of similarity is
symmetrical. Asymmetries are derived by introducing
additional factors, such as bias, salience, or coherence.
Tversky introduces the notion that some features are more
distinctive than others. Ortony et al and Gentner and
Bowdle seek to capture the notion that similarity
comparisons are psychologically informative. Nevertheless,
the explanations of the asymmetry lie in extensions to
symmetrical comparison procedures. A more parsimonious
solution would derive the asymmetry as a consequence of
the basic mechanism by which similarity was computed. As
we shall see below, passing an input vector through a
connectionist autoassociator does just that.
With this debate in mind, we can begin to reassess
Kitcher’s (1996) critique. Generally, there appears to be no
entirely satisfactory solution to the asymmetry problem. The
first point we might make then, is that the problem is not
unique to connectionist information processing and
therefore should not be used to single out connectionist
approaches in particular for criticism. However, the ultimate
answer to Kitcher' s argument would be to produce a
connectionist model that employed vector-coding and yet
showed realistic, non-metric similarity judgments. This is
exactly what we propose to do. The key is to move away
from the idea of similarity as the outcome of a direct
comparison procedure and to move towards the idea of
similarity as a process whose outcome can only be reported
in a post hoc fashion. The similarity process does not rely
on placing the comparative elements in some metric relation
to each other. Only the post hoc reporting (or explicit
access) of similarity requires the establishment of a metric
relation.
One way to understand this distinction is to think of the
mind as a modular information processing system. As
information passes through a module it is processed (or
transformed) and passed on to the next module. This next
module takes the transformed information as input and
continues to process the information further. Note that the
second module does not need to know anything about the
nature of the previous transformation. The system as a
whole continues to function without any need to relate
explicitly the outcome of a process (the transformed
information) with the initial state of the information prior to
processing by the first module. However, some meta-
process or control-process wishing to evaluate the
functioning of the first module can do so by sampling and
comparing the input information to the resulting output
information. We want to suggest that similarity is related to
the way in which information is processed (transformed)
whereas the reporting of similarity judgments is a meta-
cognitive process requiring the explicit comparison of
information prior and subsequent to processing by the
cognitive system.
The rest of this paper will describe how such similarity
arises naturally from connectionist information processing
through a process of selective dimensional distortion of the
input vectors. The degree to which distortion occurs is
inversely related to the similarity between the input vector
and the contextualized knowledge stored in the network.
4. Transformational Function Similarity
Feedforward connectionist networks implement a
transformation function from an input space to an output
space. The dimensionality of the input and output spaces are
defined by the task domain. Consider the set of networks for
which the input and output space are of the same
dimensionality. Such networks can be seen as engines that
twist and distort the metric relations of the input space.
Autoassociators are a subset of this set of networks for
which a number of input vectors are exactly reproduced by
the network. These vectors are invariant under the
transformation that the network performs.
The training set of a fully trained autoassociator constitute
the invariant vectors. In standard matrix algebra, vectors
which are invariant under matrix multiplication (modulo
multiplication by a constant) are described as eigenvectors.
By analogy, we might define the trained inputs to an
autoassociator network as the quasi-eigenvectors or q-
eigenvectors of the network's trans-formation function. Parts
of the input space in the neighborhood of these q-
eigenvectors will act as attractor basins and map onto the
invariant vector at the output. This is what gives the
network the power to deal with noisy input and to perform
pattern completion. Other input vectors will be distorted
according to how much they lie within the attractor basins
of the network's q-eigenvectors. If they lie completely
within an attractor basin, they will be mapped onto a
particular eigenvector. However, in most cases, an unrelated
input vector will fall across several attractor basins, each of
which will attempt to map that segment of the input vector
onto its appropriate q-eigenvector. What results will be a
significant distortion of the input vector, with different parts
being mapped onto different q-eigen-vectors.
More formally, the transformation function implemented
by this network is:
OUTPUT = f(INPUT) = M2(g(M1(INPUT)))      (2)
where OUTPUT is the output vector, INPUT is the input
vector, M1 is the matrix of weights between the input and
hidden units, M2 is the matrix of weights between the
hidden units and the output units, and g(x) is a non-linear
monotonic function (such as the logistic function) applied to
each component of x.
The degree to which an input is distorted will depend on
how close INPUT is to an eigenvector of M1, how strongly
non-linear g(x) is, and how close g(M1(INPUT)) is to the
eigenvectors of M2. Note that because g(x) is non-linear, it
is not metric preserving and hence f itself is not a metric
invariant transformation. The function implemented by a
feedforward network does not preserve metric relations.
We can then define Transformational Function Similarity
(TFS) as the inverse of the distance between the original
input and the transformed output of the network (i.e.
1/√error score). Comparing A to B involves presenting A to
a network able to autoassociate B and evaluating how much
A has been transformed by the q-eigenvector encoding the B
representation. Patterns that experience a small degree of
transformation are very similar to B, whereas patterns that
are transformed to a high degree are dissimilar to B. The
transformation occurs naturally as part of connectionist
information processing. The evaluation of the
transformation (measuring the degree of distortion of A) is a
post hoc process that can involve metric comparisons.
5. An example of TFS measurements
In order to generate notional knowledge bases to illustrate
TFS measurements, we will define 3 concepts, {a}, {b}, and
{c}. Each concept will comprise 3 prototypes, defined over
a vector of 15 features. We generate 10 exemplars from
each prototype, by adding Gaussian noise (sd=0.2). The
network will gain its knowledge of each concept by training
on each set of 30 exemplars. A network is trained to
autoassociate each knowledge base over separate
representational resources. The network is shown in Figure
1.1
For each knowledge base, we derive a mean vector from
the set of exemplars. This represents the central tendency of
that knowledge base and will provide us with a
characterization of the knowledge stored in the network, for
comparative purposes in the analysis provided below. The
mean vectors are as follows.
a' = .1 .6 .6 .1 .6 .6 .1 .1 .1 .1 .3 .3 .3 .3 .2
b' = .1 .1 .1 .1 .6 .6 .1 .7 .6 .1 .3 .2 .3 .3 .2
c' = .1 .6 .6 .1 .4 .4 .1 .6 .6 .1 .3 .3 .3 .3 .2
If we define the metric similarity between these vectors as
the inverse of the Euclidean distance between them, then
their metric similarities are as follows.
aSb = 0.9, bSc = 1.1, aSc = 1.1
Note that these values are symmetrical:
bSa = 0.9, cSb = 1.1, cSa = 1.1
Now consider the TFS values (where TFS is defined as
1/√SSE of the autoassociator):
aSb = 1.0, bSc = 1.3, cSa = 1.1
These are not symmetrical measures:
bSa = 1.0, cSb = 1.1, aSc = 1.3
The TFS measure is at a maximum when the mean vector
for a given knowledge base is transformed by that
knowledge base. Thus
aSa = 2.5, bSb = 2.5, cSc = 2.5
These figures are the average of 12 runs of the network.
This averaged result demonstrates that in principle,
transformation based comparisons do not have to be
symmetrical. However, it also masks individual cases where
there are greater asymmetries in the comparisons (see
Figure 2, cases 1 & 2). This demonstrates that comparisons
will be sensitive to prior network states and the nature of the
exemplar set to which the network is exposed.
                                                          
1
 6 hidden units were used to represent each knowledge base,
and the sub-networks were trained for 1000 epochs with a learning
rate of 0.1 and a momentum of 0. The network also employed
sigmoidal output units. Network weights were initially randomized
between ±1.0. The transformation function of a given net-work
will be sensitive to its architecture and the conditions of its
training.
In this example, we have used the mean of the training
exemplars, a', to represent the input vector in the
comparison A is like B. This is a simplification. Subjects
will use their own conceptual store (reflecting their personal
history of encounters with the exemplars) to internally
generate the most prototypical representation of a concept in
the given context, rather than a simple average of all their
encounters with exemplars of that concept. It is this
representation that will be transformed in the comparison.
Nevertheless, the current example demonstrates that TFS
similarity may generate comparisons that are not
symmetrical.
6. Concepts and classification
The psychological story behind this form of processing is
as follows. Similarity judgments per se are not a primary
function of the cognitive system. Similarity arises as a
consequence of classification. It is of crucial importance for
an organism to be able to classify new situations and objects
in its environment so that it may bring to bear appropriate
knowledge in dealing with them. Given a set of features that
describe a new situation/object, the cognitive system’s task
is one of pattern recognition. This is a task that
connectionist networks are well suited to perform. A
frequently proposed architecture for connectionist pattern
recognition is autoassociation. To establish whether X is an
instance of A, we find out whether a network trained to
autoassociate the various instances of A can accurately
reproduce X. The similarity judgment is a reflection of the
accuracy of that reproduction. In this view, similarity
judgments do not require a special purpose mechanism.
Similarity judgments are an adjunct to our ability to classify.
In general, the representation of a concept is developed
through experience with a range of exemplars. A network
that autoassociates knowledge about these exemplars will
extract a prototype of the concept, to which it will respond
preferentially. This reflects the typicality effects demon-
strated by humans in classification tasks (Rosch, 1973). A
network that represents a concept will thus tend to generate
q-eigenvectors for the prototype or prototypes of that
concept.
       7. The representation of concepts and the 
role of context in comparisons
In Figure 1, we have split the representations of the
concepts {a}, {b}, and {c}, into separate sub-networks. In
fact, it is more likely that concepts would share
representations as a function of their similarity. One avenue
of future work would be to determine how this organization
might emerge by virtue of the learning procedure.
We envisage that specific instances of a general concept
would be represented as specific mappings across the
general area of the network responsible for representing the
general concept. Thus the concept {Michael Jordan} would
be a mapping across the sub-network responsible for
representing basketball players. This has the following
implication with regards to similarity comparisons. Asking
whether X is similar to a basketball player enforces a given
transformation on X. Asking whether X is similar to
Michael Jordan, however, would involve using this same
basketball network with the Michael Jordan label activated.
This would modify the transformation performed by the
network. In this example, the Michael Jordan label plays the
role of contextual information, that mediates the
transformation performed by the basketball player network.
This illustrates the more general point that Transformational
Function Similarity is context sensitive.
8. Bias, Salience, and Coherence revisited
We have claimed that asymmetries in comparisons fall
naturally out of the comparison process itself. In section 3,
we reported a number of additional factors proposed as
explanations for how basically symmetrical comparison
Input Semantic Features
Output Semantic Features
Hidden units
representing concept A
Hidden units
representing concept B
Hidden units
representing concept C
Figure 1: Example neural network architecture for performing similarity 
     judgments using Transformational Function Similarity.
procedures could generate asymmetries. The notions of bias
and salience were ascribed to individual concepts. For
example, when a concept with a high salience formed the
second term of a comparison, then similarity was greater
than if it formed the first term. The TFS approach also
allows for effects stemming from individual concepts. These
will relate to the normal factors which determine how well
networks perform transformations in general. Thus an
autoassociative network with more training will tend to
produce more accurate reproductions than an equivalent
network with less training. And within a given network,
exemplars appearing more often in the training set will tend
to be reproduced more accurately than those presented less
often. The network performing the transformation
corresponds to the second term in the comparison. If we see
the salience of a concept as equivalent to the amount of
training a network has received on that concept, then the
claim that more salient concepts produce greater similarity
judgments when they form the second term of a comparison
corresponds to the idea that a better trained autoassociator
with more training, autoassociates better.
The second term is also privileged when it is a more
general or prototypical case of a given concept. Thus
subjects prefer Red China to come second in the comparison
of Red China and North Korea because China is the more
general case of a communist country (Ortony, Vondruska,
Foss, and Jones, 1985). In network terms, this preference
reflects that fact that an autoassociator trained on a wider
range of patterns will tend to produce more accurate
autoassociations of any given pattern. Thus a network
trained on every possible autoassociation would reproduce
every pattern very accurately. Every pattern would have a
high similarity to that knowledge base.
Gentner and Bowdle (1994) put forward the notion of
coherence to explain how a symmetrical mapping procedure
could generate asymmetrical comparisons. Similarity will
be judged greater when the more coherent concept comes
second in a comparison. The notion of coherence is tied to
theories concerning the relation between linguistically
structured representations - that is, those constructed along
assumptions of compositionality and systematicity.
Connectionist networks are not currently at a stage to give
robust accounts of conceptual representation, so long as it is
thought to be like language. We suggest that if and when
connectionist accounts extend to give accounts of the human
behavior that has led to the Language of Thought
hypothesis, then the TFS theory may similarly be extended.
(For example, a structural comparison of the concepts A and
B, might involve a transformation of the structure of A
using the network representing the structure of B).
In short, the TFS measure is consistent with ideas of bias
and salience previously proposed to account for asymmetry
effects. Both fall naturally out of the training procedures
used with connectionist autoassociators. For the moment, it
is difficult to see how the idea of coherence could be
extended to the TFS measure.
   9. Analogy: Static Mapping or High Level 
Perception?
Previous computational models of analogy have broadly
fallen into two camps. The first of these sees analogical
comparisons as involving mappings or links between two
static representations (e.g. ACME: Holyoak and Thagard,
1989). Some kind of mapping "engine" sees how well one
representation fits over another: whether they have the same
shape, which parts of one correspond to which parts of the
other, and so on. The second view sees analogical
comparisons as involving the formation of new,
dynamically configured representations, created by the
Case 2.
Figure 2: These triangles show the similarity-distance between
three concepts {a}, {b}, and {c}, generated by a Metric similarity
measure (Euclidean distance) or by the metric comparison phase
of the Transformational Function procedure. The metric
comparison is symmetrical. TF similarity is asymmetrical, varying
according to the direction of comparison (Clockwise = a to c, c to
b, b to a; Anti-clockwise = a to b, b to c, c to a). The length of the
side between two vertices corresponds to the inverse of the
similarity between the corresponding concepts. (See Section 5 for
more details).
a
c
b
c c
a ab b
c
c c
a a ab b b
c
c c
a a ab b b
Case 1.Mean.
Metric Clockwise TFS Anti-clockwise TFS
Metric Clockwise TFS Anti-clockwise TFS
Metric Clockwise TFS Anti-clockwise TFS
comparison process itself (e.g. Copycat: Hofstadter, 1984;
Mitchell, 1993;  Tabletop: Hofstadter and French, 1994).
These researchers describe analogy as a process of “high
level perception”. In the comparison A is like B, the process
really is one of seeing A as if it were B.
Theories of analogy must be based on an underlying
notion of similarity. A theory of analogy based on the TFS
view would have a foot in both of the above camps. A
comparison initially involves a transformation, which
generates a new representation. For A is like B, B
knowledge transforms the A representation to create a new
representation, B(A). Thomas and Mareschal (1996)
proposed that this new representation might be seen as a
metaphorical comprehension of A, transformed by seeing A
as B. To measure the similarity of A to B (for example, in
order that one might respond in a similarity judgment task),
one must evaluate how well B knowledge has reproduced
the A representation. That is, a procedure must compare the
static representations for A and B(A). To derive a list of
features which A and B have in common, one notes the
features of A that have been strongly reproduced in B(A).
Under a TFS view, first there is a transformation, then there
is a comparison. In other words, analogy involves both
processes of high level perception and of the comparison of
static representations.
10. Conclusion
In this paper we have outlined Kitcher’s (1996) criticism
of connectionist processing; namely, that Connectionism
employs similarity based processing, but that its basis of
similarity is not supported in human similarity judgments.
We have sketched out an approach based on connectionist
processing, in which similarity is conceptualized as a
transformation. Transformational Function Similarity (TFS)
naturally exhibits asymmetry in comparisons, so that the
similarity of A to B is not always equal to the similarity of
B to A. This asymmetry emerges directly from the non-
linear processing of connectionist networks. Connectionist
processing is thus consistent with psychological notions of
similarity, and Kitcher’s criticism is unwarranted.
Other theories of similarity have accounted for the
asymmetric nature of comparisons by extending basically
symmetrical comparison procedures. In the TFS account,
the asymmetry is a property of the comparison procedure
itself. The notion of similarity as a transformation offers a
basis from which to explain effects such as asymmetry that
arise from highly constrained empirical situations, such as
asking subjects to compare countries. Such tasks are thought
to be simple and to reveal the basic processes of similarity
judgments. That asymmetries exist even in apparently
straightforward examples could be taken to imply that the
basic mechanisms underlying comparisons must themselves
generate the asymmetry. However, these considerations may
obscure the fact that there are many more complex types of
analogical problem solving, which involve the extended
comparisons of previously unrelated domains. We suggest
that the explanations for simple, rapid judgments of
similarity between concepts may differ from those required
to account for slower, reasoning based comparisons. The
TFS account lies very much with the class of simple, rapid
mechanisms.
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